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Introduction 
 
The vast financial disturbances which broke out in 2007, leading to unprecedented state intervention 
to rescue financial systems in 2008, surely necessitate a reconsideration of the role and prospects of 
the global financial system which has developed over the last decades. That system is widely 
recognised to be both a central component of the global economy as a whole and a key driving force 
in its emergence and transformation. For example, only the enormous financial recycling operation 
linked to China’s export surplus has permitted the exceptional growth of the Chinese economy. 
 
The continuing crisis of major banks, other large financial corporations and capital markets clearly 
impairs core functions of the financial system. Both political reactions to the crisis and the reactions 
of market participants themselves are bound to enforce major changes in the system. These are 
difficult to foresee – the present essay only sketches some possible lines of development. 
 
The next section looks at certain features of the crisis and suggests that it represents not simply 
another financial crisis but a crisis of finance itself. The following section argues that neither 
financial globalisation nor the increasing importance of financial markets are likely to be 
interrupted by the crisis; rather will both market actors and regulators have to grapple with the 
introduction of specific public goods, without which both the stability and the efficiency of the 
global financial system will be permanently at risk. The concluding section speculates on the 
possible long-run consequences of the crisis. 
 
 
A Crisis of Finance 
 
The liberalisation of finance, from the 1970s onwards, in most advanced economies, together with 
the removal or attenuation of many regulatory restrictions and controls, led to a chronic 
destabilisation of finance from the beginning of the 1980s onwards. From the start the main victims 
of crises were in the developing world. Indeed, the most serious such episode, in 1982, was the 
outbreak of a crisis of third world indebtedness which, aggravated by harsh and misguided policies 
at the IMF, had grave and long-lasting effects across much of Africa and Latin America. 
 
It is not yet clear whether the financial turbulence which broke out in 2007 will have such 
devastating social consequences. However, to a much greater extent than previous crises, it calls 
into question the global financial system as such. There are several reasons for this. 
 
Scale 
Firstly, where several of the previous crises were centred on peripheral or emerging markets, or on 
the high-technology sector of developed economies, the latest crisis is clearly centred on the 
financial sectors of the United States and Western Europe. Moreover, most of the problematic 
financial claims relate to the finance of US real estate – this is by far the biggest financial market in 
the world. Outstanding household mortgage debt, on its own, is much larger than either government 
or corporate debt (and the latter also includes large amounts of mortgage debt).1 The understandable 
interest of many researchers in corporate finance and in international financial transactions should 
not obscure the sheer scale of North American real estate finance. 
 
Of course, to begin with, only a small fraction of these real estate claims were called into question – 
the subprime mortgages which, repackaged and resold, became the collateralised debt obligations at 
the centre of the subsequent turmoil. But more and more mortgages were affected, partly by the 
contagion of doubt among similar assets, partly by the fall in real estate prices which undermined 
previously adequate collateral. 
  
Leverage undoubtedly contributed to the enormous profits of major banks during the bubble. The 
“big five” British banks, for example, declared profits of £37 billion in 2006 – the year before the 
crisis broke out. This sum represented nearly 13% of all corporate profits in the UK and nearly 4% 
of total UK GDP. 
 
The sheer scale of the crisis was then multiplied by the same leverage mechanisms which had 
expanded and intensified the subprime bubble. Losses relative to the own capital of the banks and 
hedge funds concerned were multiplied because so much borrowed money had been used to obtain 
increased subprime exposure. 
 
This effect in turn was aggravated by the break-down of tactics widely used by the banks to avoid 
capital adequacy regulations. Most of the dubious mortgage-backed assets had been moved off the 
balance sheets of the banks themselves into various “conduits” or “Special Investment Vehicles” 
(SIVs). This meant that the banks themselves did not have to raise capital to match the risks 
involved. Most of the SIVs, however, were funded by short-term borrowing which became difficult 
or impossible to roll over as the quality of their assets was called into question and alarm spread 
through the credit markets. Thus banks had to take the mortgage–based assets back onto their 
balance sheets and ensure that enough risk-adjusted capital was in place to meet regulatory 
requirements. These risks, of course, were growing at the same time. The ratings agencies, which 
had initially given astonishingly high credit-worthiness ratings to sub-prime-based and similar 
assets, now rapidly downgraded them, increasing the capital needed.2 
 
The move to highly leveraged positions had been very general and had affected other sectors 
besides residential mortgages. Thus the rapid expansion of both hedge funds and private equity 
investment in Europe towards the end of the bubble period was part of the same general attempt to 
increase the yield on financial assets by assuming more debt. Hedge funds and private equity are 
two very types of investment vehicle – but they do have in common the use of very high gearing 
and this accounts for the simultaneous expansion in the years up to 2006 (PSE, 2007).  
 In the subsequent crisis, many of these positions also had to be unwound because the assets were 
losing value and the credit by which they were funded was drying up. 
 
For all these reasons, the credit crisis involved losses on an unprecedented scale. The main factor 
involved, however, seems to have been the very general move to highly leveraged positions.3 This 
in turn reflected a general reluctance to accept what would otherwise have been much lower rates of 
return on financial assets than had been the case over the previous twenty-five years.  
 
When an individual bank takes a more leveraged position, it increases its own exposure to systemic 
risk, but that risk as such does not necessarily increase. However, when the sector as whole does so, 
the risk of system-wide disturbance is bound to grow. Central banks and other regulatory authorities 
around the world seem to have been aware that this was happening but were reluctant to respond by 
higher interest rates or tightened regulatory constraints because of the wish to extend the 
macroeconomic upturn. The consequence was a system breakdown on such a scale as to constitute a 
very serious threat to production and employment. 
 
The deregulatory Zeitgeist was also a factor: the banks and other financial corporations have been 
powerful forces behind the continuing drive to dismantle many forms of social control over 
economic life. One consequence of such lobbying was the promulgation of new, and much less 
restrictive, capital adequacy standards for international banks (Basel II) at just the time when the 
bubble burst. Regulators had been repeatedly warned that Basel II would aggravate the cycle by 
requiring banks to raise additional capital in economic downturns, that it gave far too much scope to 
banks to disguise the risks of their positions and that it did not impose sufficient transparency on 
bank accounting practices. The neglect of these prescient criticisms means that Basel II will almost 
certainly be rapidly superseded by new, more rigorous, regulatory arrangements.    
 
Impairment of the Banks               
Secondly, the crisis struck at the central actors of the global financial system – the banks. It has 
been a central feature of financial globalisation that classical bank intermediation has to some extent 
been displaced by the growth of security markets. This never meant, however, that the banks were 
less important as financial actors – on the contrary they have played a leading role in the security 
markets – as market-makers, market analysts and fund managers as well as in their more established 
functions of underwriting security issues and financing security trading (Plihon et al., 2006).   
 
A necessary condition for the banks to play this key role has been the globalisation of interbank 
relations. In fact the money markets of the advanced economies, largely dominated by inter-bank 
credit flows, are the most completely globalised component of international finance and the major 
international banks which are active lenders and borrowers across currency zones could be regarded 
as the core of the global system.4  
 
The banks concerned, which it is plausible to take as those linked to the CHIPS payment system, 
have undergone a ferocious concentration process bringing down their number from 142 in 1985 to 
46 today.5 The crisis has accelerated this process because even among these giants there are banks 
which have been badly affected by the credit crunch and the associated write-downs of assets and 
which are looking for safety in a merger. 
 
These giants have the closest interconnections, supported by the deployment of extremely powerful 
information and communication technologies. Together they form a coherent system at the core of 
global finance. The fact that they use different currencies has disguised these close 
interdependencies from some commentators, but in fact the huge amounts of currency traded on 
foreign exchange markets represent, much more than “casino” speculation, a vast international 
interbank credit market. (The frequent misinterpretation of FX trading as essentially currency 
speculation is discussed in Grahl and Lysandrou, 2003.)  
 The growth of security trading around the world is completely dependent on the functioning of 
these interbank markets because this is how the banks are able to finance security trading. 
 
The impairment of this system through the crisis was never the “paralysis” sometimes evoked in the 
press, because that would have meant a catastrophic breakdown of the entire economy. At the start, 
problems were confined to unsecured term interbank credit and what happened was a rise in the risk 
and liquidity spreads in the interest rates concerned, rather than a cessation of lending. Most 
interbank lending is against collateral and these markets continued to function more or less 
normally. 
 
However, as bank balance sheets continued to deteriorate, problems of illiquidity were combined 
with a growing threat of insolvency. (See the commentaries by Willem Buiter on the Financial 
Times website.) The failure of the investment bank, Lehman Brothers, seems to have concentrated 
minds and tensions spread to interbank relations as a whole while the banks perceived as most 
vulnerable suffered runs on their credit which they could no longer roll over at any interest rate.6    
 
In general, financial crises tend to be more or less severe according to whether or not risks are 
concentrated in the banking system (Boyer et al., 2004).6  Such a concentration was certainly the 
case here, with an IMF estimate that, out of some $1.4 trillion of losses and write-downs through 
the crisis to October 2008, the banks had incurred at least some $725 billion and possibly as much 
as $820 billion (IMF, 2008, p9). In principle, a fraction of the losses by banks and other agents were 
insured either through  “monoline bond insurance companies” or the use of credit default swaps, but 
the authorities, by buying many of the most dubious assets, tried hard to avoid too much stress 
being placed on these insurance systems for fear of another wave of failures and asset price falls. 
  
Interbank credit represents an enormous economy of monetary resources, with a relatively restricted 
aggregate deposit base supporting a vast and rapidly growing amount of financial transactions. By 
the same token its collapse would be the equivalent of an immense monetary deflation. By the 
autumn of 2008, however, only unprecedented and coordinated interventions by governments 
prevented such a collapse. Many of the giant banking corporations at the centre of global finance 
were now subjected to  political tutelage.  
 
Loss of Control 
A third novel feature of the crisis was the loss of control by central banks. Macroeconomic 
textbooks usually assert that monetary policy is implemented through the central bank’s control 
over short-term interest rates. By the summer of 2007 this truism was being re-examined as it 
became clear that the interest rates charged to households and businesses had become detached 
from the official rates set by central banks. As the latter were eased in response to financial distress 
and weakening economic activity, the former remained stubbornly high. 
 
It is here that interest rates on unsecured term interbank lending become highly significant because 
these rates such as LIBOR or EURIBOR (London or Euro interbank offered rate, respectively) are 
the benchmarks used to set interest rates on a very large amount of private lending. The banks were 
not prepared to reduce the rates at which they lent to their customers in step with reductions in 
central bank target rates.  
 
In fact, central banks are relatively small players in credit markets. (For example, the Bank of 
England in 2007 had assets totalling £39 billion, although this grew in the crisis to £73 billion in 
2008; compare Barclays – one of the “big five” British commercial banks, with assets of £1.3 
trillion in 2007.)  They typically target directly only one very short-run interest rate, that in 
unsecured overnight interbank lending, and rely on substitution among the different credit markets 
to influence the general level of short-run rates in the economy as a whole. Implicitly, this depended 
on the strength and stability of the big commercial banks as well as their confidence in one another. 
Given those conditions, the commercial banking sector as a whole came close to being part of the 
state in that it could borrow on approximately the same terms as could central government.  
 
The impairment of the big banks put an end to this situation. A huge spread opened up between 
one-month and three month interbank interest rates and those in the overnight markets still, more or 
less, under central bank control. (It is interesting that this happened at virtually the same time and to 
approximately the same extent in dollar, euro and sterling money markets, testifying to the close, 
global, integration of the financial sectors concerned. That the Japanese banking sector escaped the 
credit crisis with relatively limited damage seems to be due to the severity and persistence of the 
Japanese banking crisis from the late eighties onwards.) These spreads correspond to the liquidity 
and risk premia exacted by the banks’ creditors.  ( For a detailed analysis, IMF, 2008a, chapter 2). 
At the same time, the interest rates on lending to the government went very low indeed as wealth-
holders sought a safe haven. (Late in October 2008, the annual yield on three month US Treasury 
Bills was below 1% while the corresponding rate in Germany was 1.75%.) 
 
 
These gaps persisted, and even widened, in spite of big moves by the central banks to re-establish 
control. They started lending much greater sums to the banks, for longer periods and accepting a 
much wider range of assets as collateral. Thus a central tool of macroeconomic policy has itself 
been impaired by the crisis. In a deteriorating macroeconomic climate, where interest rate 
reductions for household and business borrowers would normally be a key policy response, this 
situation eventually provoked quite radical proposals. Suggestions include channelling all interbank 
lending through the central bank or expanding the scope and scale of central bank lending in other 
ways. In any case it seems likely that central bank balance sheets will grow substantially relative to 
those of commercial banks and other financial corporations, leading perhaps to a permanent shift in 
the balance between public and private power in the financial sector. 
 
Such a development would to some extent at least reverse the monetarist reassignment of 
macroeconomic functions which began in the 1980s. The sole goal of monetary policy was to be 
price stability, rather than either financial stability or support for general macroeconomic policies. 
The minimalist central bank – with a very limited balance sheet – is to some extent a consequence 
of the approach to monetary policy adopted at that time. To that extent, central banks may be 
recovering some of their previous functions, although in a very different context. 
 
 
Reform, not Fragmentation 
 
The argument so far has merely been to characterise the credit crisis as being, in at least three 
important respects, different from and more severe than previous crises: the combination of the 
scale of the disturbances, the impairment of the large banks at the centre of global finance and the 
weakened control of central banks suggests that this is not simply a financial crisis, but a crisis of 
finance, calling into question the both structure and the functioning of the financial system. 
 
It is much more difficult to go beyond these descriptions to assess the possible nature and direction 
of future changes to this system. Any such assessment has also to consider the new political 
situation. The financial débacle is the biggest blow ever suffered by neoliberal ideology and the 
biggest ever setback for the neoliberal project. Thus a much wider range of economic strategies are 
now becoming politically possible than in the recent past where neoliberalism has dominated and 
this makes future developments even more uncertain.   
 
However, some implications of the crisis already seem relatively clear. Firstly, the financial sector, 
and especially major banks, are likely to be subjected to much closer, more intrusive and more 
comprehensive regulation. Some obvious examples can be given. ( It has to be acknowledged that 
some regulatory issues raise technical difficulties beyond the expertise of the writer. For a recent 
account, responding to the first phases of the crisis, Davies and Green, 2008.) Reforms to bank 
accounting will be used to control off-balance sheet assets and liabilities and to reassert capital 
requirements over the entirety of a banks’ positions. The conflicts of interest which have clearly 
distorted the work of the ratings agencies will be addressed. There will be a push for more complete 
and up-to-date reporting of the positions taken by banks and hedge funds. Some reforms also seem 
likely to reduce the immense incomes enjoyed by those at the head of financial corporations. Many 
of the parameters of regulation are likely to become cyclically variable to avoid the exacerbation of 
cyclical upswings and downswings by existing regulatory structures.  
 
Secondly, it seems already clear that the crisis has not called into question but rather reinforced the 
global character of the financial system. One aspect of this is the serious attempts that were made, 
in spite of a some initial disarray, to coordinate the official responses to the crisis. Central banks, 
firstly, organised a series of simultaneous monetary policy changes and other coordinated 
interventions; central bank literature shows that, although little action was taken during the 
subprime bubble, there was a growing concern with stability issues and intense communication and 
debate among central banks about them. ( For an account of arrangements in Europe see ECB, 
2006.)   
 
 
Serious government intervention began in the autumn of 2008 with the rescue package proposed by 
US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and eventually adopted by the Congress and a rescue 
package, including the provision of new capital for the banks from the government, in Britain. 
Coordination of such policy interventions seems to have begun almost at once, both within the EU 
and among the G7 group of the largest economies. There were clearly dangers of spillover effects 
from some types of intervention, such as the Irish government’s guarantee of bank liabilities, and 
some clashes, notably between Britain and Iceland, but in general the international nature of the 
crisis and the need for an international response seem to have been recognised early (Iceland’s 
appeal for credit from the Russian Federation is an interesting illustration of  the geo-political shifts 
which may be accelerated by the crisis). Reference to global forces might also, of course, be an 
attempt to evade responsibility by national political leaders, but on the whole the political language 
used seems to be justified by economic and financial events. 
 
The responses to crisis in the private sector also seem to have reinforced the global character of the 
system. Protectionist tactics were hardly to be expected from the big banking corporations who 
surely place a very high value on their freedom of action, but there were some indications that the 
banks were mobilising international resources to meet the crisis. The intervention of sovereign 
wealth funds to supply new capital to Western banks went very badly for the former, who came in 
too early, bought bank equity too dear and suffered huge losses in consequence (Demarolle and  
Johanet, 2008). Nevertheless, these actions may foreshadow larger shifts in the ownership and 
control of the global financial system in the future. 
 
It was mentioned above that the globalisation of finance has been marked by a substantial change in 
the structure of finance, away from classical bank intermediation and towards a much bigger role 
for organised security markets – for both company shares and, especially, bonds. Does the 
“securitization” fiasco mean the end of this trend? The view taken here is that such an outcome is 
extremely unlikely. A security is a marketable claim. It is necessary to distinguish between the legal 
and economic interpretations of this definition. The whole range of “toxic” assets arising from the 
subprime bubble had the legal form of marketability but they often lacked its economic content – 
the markets for such paper were thin and inadequate even towards the end of the bubble when the 
absurd AA and AAA ratings had not yet been exposed. (For just this reason these assets had yields 
well in excess of what could normally be expected from high-grade paper.) It was pointed out above 
that much of the risks involved stayed with the banks – this in itself indicates that formal 
securitization did not really correspond to the creation of a functioning market.  
 
To function in effective way, asset markets require a certain standardisation. The possibility or 
otherwise of such standardisation determines whether the widespread recognition of the asset which 
is needed for tradability exists. The key advantages of traditional “relationship” banking over the 
public issue of securities arises where credits or investments are too specific to permit a wide 
market to develop. As Michel Aglietta (2008) points out, when such standardisation is not possible, 
securitization destroys information. The thin, fragile markets for subprime-based collateralised debt 
obligations destroyed it on an enormous scale, with potential buyers knowing less and less about the 
nature of the claims being offered. 
 
Similar considerations apply to the huge growth of financial derivatives. Those which have given 
rise to most difficulties are OTC (over-the-counter) instruments rather than the much smaller total 
of standardised, exchange-traded derivatives where big defaults are unlikely because changing 
prices are rapidly reflected in payments by counterparties with deficit positions. In the case of both 
asset-based obligations and OTC derivatives, the danger was a confusion between types of claim. 
Those which are highly specific or which depend on detailed knowledge of a particular agent 
should stay with or close to the original creditor because information will be destroyed by 
secondary trading; those which are effectively standardised can be safely traded on secondary 
markets. What is to be avoided is a confusion whereby claims are moved off banks’ balance sheets 
without being effectively distributed across liquid secondary markets. Regulation should perhaps 
encourage a certain standardisation of claims; this is often said to discourage innovation but, in both 
retail and wholesale financial markets, it is now clear that many supposed innovations are either 
exercises in spurious product-differentiation or, quite simply, scams. A somewhat slower pace of 
financial innovation is perhaps desirable. 
 
The broad trend from classical bank intermediation to security markets is not yet fully understood. 
On one view, the main reason for it is regulatory – the imposition of risk-adjusted capital 
requirements on the banks. However, it is also possible to interpret the shift in terms of economic 
development – as supporting financial relations among a very large number of agents and on a very 
great scale. Thus the clear lead of the US in the development of security markets could reflect the 
fact that, even before the era of global finance, this was a vast economic system spread over a huge 
area (Grahl, 2001; Lysandrou, 2005).  
 
Thus, although one can be certain that much tighter controls will be put on bank activities, both the 
global character of financial systems and the increased role of security markets seem likely to 
survive the crisis, and indeed may even be advanced by it. 
 
 
Two Conjectures 
 
The predictions made in the previous section are already somewhat tentative. At the time of writing 
the end of the crisis is not yet in sight and there is no possibility of any definitive assessment of its 
course and consequences. Instead of attempting to reach clear conclusions, two possibile lines of 
development will be sketched in this last section – both of them speculations but with a certain 
rationale. 
 
Firstly, there now seems to be a real possibility that the world economy is entering a period of 
cheap capital and low rates of return. Since the Volcker shock of 1979 (the drastic change in US 
monetary policy with very high interest rates) the potential abundance of investible funds has been 
prevented from driving down target rates of return in industry and commerce. During the 1980s, 
very tight monetary policies and a general search for liquidity by potential investors kept interest 
rates at very high levels. Real (that is, inflation adjusted) rates were driven higher by the fact that 
disinflation ran ahead of monetary policy relaxation. In the 1990s, rates on government debt came 
dowen markedly, but the very high rates of return sought by investors in the equity markets 
prevented this from lowering the cost of risk-bearing capital. These unsustainable conventions as to 
rates of return were shaken by the dot.com crash when it turned out that in many cases high 
reported shareholder returns were illusory. Then in the subprime bubble banks used massive 
leverage in an ultimately futile attempt to raise the return on their capital. 
 
One lesson of these episodes is that a sustainable convention, among investors, of a general rate of 
return has something of the character of a public good. The authorities might in the future use their 
analytical and research resources to diffuse realistic expectations as to yields; they will certainly try 
to police the use of leverage by major financial corporations. One result could be a general decline 
in yields and interest rates, not simply on government debt, but also on industrial investments and 
consumer credit. If this happened the social consequences, particularly in labour markets could be 
dramatic. The persistent deterioration in the relative bargaining position of employees has been 
caused to a considerable extent by the high rates of return which were routinely pursued on 
industrial assets. It is impossible to predict how such a change in the balance of power in the labour 
market would be expressed – a revival of traditional trade unionism seems rather unlikely. But a 
reassertion of employee interests in some form would most certainly be encouraged by cheap 
capital. One of the main forces pressing down on the confidence and the ambitions of the popular 
classes would be weakened.  
 
The second conjecture is even more speculative. At present the global financial system is being 
rescued by governments and at public expense. This is bound to lead to reforms – the way the 
system works will change. It is at least conceivable, however, that change will go further than this – 
that there will be a challenge to the finalities of the system, to its goals and the priorities among 
them. To envisage such a develoment is certainly to take a sanguine view of the global economy 
and global financial relations. But, whether or not such a transformation is feasible, it is most 
certainly necessary. The key priorities of development in the poorest countries and of environmental 
protection cannot plausibly be asserted in economic life unless they shape the financial constraints 
on households and businesses. Only if the global financial system becomes the bearer of these 
objectives do they have the slightest possibility of realisation. This is a long way from the 
speculation and excess which has disfigured Western financial centres in recent years. But it is to be 
hoped that the end of that world may make another possible.                 
 
 
 
Endnotes 
1. At end 2007, household mortgage debt in the US stood at $10.5 trillion; corporate debt was $6.3 trillion; government 
(Federal, State and local) $7.3 trillion; claims on foreign debtors $1.9 trillion. Federal Reserve (2008) p8.  
2. For the disastrous role played by credit rating agencies in the assessment of sub-prime mortgages and the 
collateralised debt obligations based on them see, IMF (2008a) chapter 2, box 2.2, “When is a AAA not a AAA?”. 
3. It should be noted that, contrary to the declarations of the European Commission (D.-G. Internal Market press 
release, 27th February 2008) and some political leaders in Europe, the drive for high leverage was even more marked in 
Europe than in the US itself. Daniel Gros and Stefano Micosi  report that, “the dozen largest European banks have now 
on average an overall leverage ratio (shareholder equity to total assets) of 35, compared to less than 20 for the largest 
US banks.” These economists recognise that the leverage numbers reported to regulators are much lower, but they 
explain this by the “massive in-house investment banking operations of European banks” which “are not subject to any 
regulatory capital requirement.” They give the following figures for the leverage ratios of European banks as of 30th 
June 2008: UBS, 46.9; ING 48.8; Barclays, 61.3; Crédit Agricole, 40.4, Deutsche (2007) 52.5. (Gros & Micosi, 
www.voxeu.org). 
4. Globalised money markets require huge amounts of collateralised foreign currency trading: the key instrument 
involved, the FX swap, accounted for the first time for more than half of all FX trading in 2007, some $1.7 trillion per 
day (out of a total of $3.2 trillion). Dollar trades against the euro, the yen, sterling Swiss francs, Australian and 
Canadian dollars and Swedish krona made up two thirds of all FX trading, again relating it to the activities of Western 
financial centres. Data from BIS (2007).  
5. This concentration was until recently dominated by mergers between banks in the same currency zone and this may 
have disguised the increasingly global nature of the system as a whole. The recently announced Commerzbank, 
Dresdner Bank continues this pattern, but the crisis has also seen a number of large international mergers and takeovers 
such as Mitsubishi’s stake in Morgan Stanley.  
6. The account in the text is based on the supposition that the monetary flows through wholesale payment systems can 
be taken as a reasonable proxy for interbank lending (it is difficult to imagine what else these enormous flows can 
represent). For example, the flow of funds through the ECB’s inter-bank payment system, TARGET, continued to grow 
throughout 2007 (from 2.19 trillion euro per day in January to 2.69 trillion in December). However, in 2008 actual falls 
are recorded from 2.76 trillion in January to 2.32 in August – the first such contraction in the system’s history. Flows 
through the New York-based CHIPS system, however, which handles dollar payments among 46 of the very biggest 
international banks, continued to grow at annual rates of 12.1% in 2007 and 9.6% in the first half of 2008. 
7. In Ireland, for example, the government issued a blanket guarantee of all bank borrowing, which comes close to 
moving, at least temporarily, the banking system as a whole into the public sphere Of course this measure, which has 
several precedents in, for example, Italy in the 1930s or Sweden in the early 1990s was taken to rescue the banks rather 
than to re-establish central control over interest rates, which are set by the ECB. But similar measures are being 
proposed to secure a general decline in market interest rates to combat recession.  
8. The neoliberal project is understood here as a political strategy which uses the intensification of certain market 
processes to roll back many of the gains achieved by the workers’ movement and other social movements in the first 
seventy years of the twentieth century. It is important to add that this definition excludes the use of the term, 
“neoliberalism” to cover all important developments in contemporary capitalism. In particular, the emergence of a 
global financial system is not seen basically as a consequence of neoliberalism, but rather as a necessary and functional 
aspect of globalisation in general, which is itself perceived as a new stage in the socialisation of production. 
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